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ABSTRACT
Some small-holders are able to generate reliable and substantial income flows 
through small-scale dairy production for the local market; for others, a set of 
unique transactions costs hinders participation.  Cooperative selling institutions 
are potential catalysts for mitigating these costs, stimulating entry into the market, 
and precipitating growth in rural communities. Trends in cooperative organization 
in East-African dairy are evaluated.  Empirical work focuses on alternative 
techniques for effecting participation among a representative sample of peri­
urban milk producers in the Ethiopian highlands. The techniques considered are 
a modern production practice (cross-bred cow use), a traditional production 
practice (indigenous-cow use), three intellectual-capital-forming variables 
(experience, education, extension), and the provision of infrastructure (as 
measured by time to transport milk to market). A Tobit analysis of marketable 
surplus generates precise estimates of non-participants’ ‘distances’ to market and 
their reservation levels of the covariates—measures of the inputs necessary to 
sustain and enhance the market. Policy implications focus on the availability of 
cross-bred stock and the level of market infrastructure, both of which have 
marked effects on participation, the velocity of transactions in the local community 
and, inevitably, the social returns to agroindustrialization. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A healthy, enlivened debate at the recent conference, ‘Agroindustrialization, 
Globalization and Economic Development’ (Nashville, Tennessee, August 5-6) 
supports two conclusions. First, while we are reasonably sure about the ceteris 
paribus impacts of increased commercialization in developing food systems, we 
know less about its ‘trickle-down’ effects on the rural poor, their predisposition 
toward exchange, and the institutional and production innovations that underlie 
these impacts. Second, given the necessary data, there is enormous scope for 
empirical inquiry around these themes and the use of modern techniques to 
derive sound policy conclusions. 
This paper considers one recent trend in the commercialization of subsistence 
agriculture that has potential to catalyze market participation, enhance the 
velocity of transactions and sustain economic growth in rural communities. The 
topic is the emergence of cooperative sales organizations among resource-poor, 
dairy producers in peri-urban settings.  
Small scale dairy production is an important source of cash income for 
subsistence farmers in the East African highlands. Dairy products are a 
traditional consumption item with strong demand, and the temperate climate 
allows the cross-breeding of local cows with European dairy breeds to raise 
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productivity.  Particularly where infrastructure and expertise in dairy processing 
exist, such markets allow small-holders to participate in the agroindustrial sub-
sector and potentially in regional export markets and beyond. Moreover, growth 
in dairy demand in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is projected to increase over the 
next twenty years due to expected population and income growth. Milk 
production and dairy product consumption are expected to grow in the region of 
3.8 to 4% annually between 1993 and 2020 (Delgado et al., 1999).  Increased 
domestic dairy production has the potential in much of SSA to generate 
additional income and employment and thereby improve the welfare of rural 
populations (Walshe et al., 1991; Winrock International, 1992; Staal et al., 1997).  
However, there are concerns that the benefits of this expected growth may 
bypass resource-poor livestock producers unless specific policy actions are 
taken. 
Barriers to small-holder participation in dairy production range from the 
availability and cost of animals to the labor needed to bring products to market. 
Despite the potential, small-holder participation in market-led dairy development 
has not been widespread in SSA outside of Kenya. Even in regions with 
favourable climates for livestock development, such as the Ethiopian highlands, 
participation in fluid milk markets by rural small-holders has been limited. 
Changes in sectoral and macroeconomic policies are frequently necessary, but 
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not sufficient, to provide the requisite incentives for small-holders to participate in 
markets.
Small-scale milk producers face many hidden costs that make it difficult for them 
to gain access to markets and productive assets (Staal et al., 1997). Among the 
barriers that may be influenced by policy are transactions costs—the pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary costs associated with arranging and carrying out an 
exchange of goods or services. The existence of relatively high marketing costs 
for fluid milk in Africa, the prevalence of thinness in fluid milk markets and the 
riskiness attached to marketing perishables in the tropics suggest that 
transactions costs play a central role in dairy production and marketing. Under 
such conditions, producer marketing co-operatives that effectively reduce 
transactions costs may enhance participation.  Hence, it is vital to know what 
governments can do to better support these organizations and their emergence, 
and determine whether alternative institutions should be encouraged. 
This paper explores the impact of household-level transactions costs and the 
choice of production technique on the decision of farmers to sell fluid milk to 
marketing cooperatives using a detailed sample of observations from the 
Ethiopian highlands (Nicholson, 1997). Covariates representing factors affecting 
production, consumption and marketable surplus are examined in order to 
determine the extent to which they influence the milk-marketing decision.  
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In the conceptual framework we employ, transactions costs include not only the 
costs of exchange, but also the complete set of costs implied when households 
must reorganize and reallocate labor in order to generate a marketable surplus. 
These costs may be substantial, may dominate other, observable (pecuniary) 
costs and, therefore, are scrutinized. We focus on a parsimonious set of factors 
conjectured to affect them, namely a modern production practice (cross-bred 
cow use), a traditional production practice (indigenous-cow use), three 
intellectual-capital-forming variables (experience, education, extension), and the 
provision of infrastructure (as measured by time to transport milk to market). We 
compute estimates from a Tobit specification of marketable surplus and use the 
estimates to draw policy conclusions. 
Section two provides a background on the transactions-costs issue.  Section 
three considers cooperatives as examples of an agroindustrial innovation with 
the potential to catalyze the emergence of milk markets. Section four presents a 
brief introduction to milk-marketing organization in the Ethiopian highlands, 
section five describes the household survey, and section six presents the data. 
Section seven motivates the Tobit model and section eight presents results. 
Discussion and conclusions are offered, respectively, in sections nine and ten. 
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2. TRANSACTIONS COSTS, COOPERATIVES AND MILK-MARKET 
PARTICIPATION
Transaction costs are the embodiment of barriers to access to market 
participation by resource poor small-holders.  They include the costs of 
searching for a partner with whom to exchange, screening potential trading 
partners to ascertain their trustworthiness, bargaining with potential trading 
partners (and officials) to reach an agreement, transferring the product, 
monitoring the agreement to see that its conditions are fulfilled, and enforcing the 
exchange agreement 
The nature of milk and its derivatives in part explains the high transactions costs 
associated with exchanges of fluid milk. Raw milk is highly perishable and, thus, 
requires rapid transportation to consumption centers or for processing into less 
perishable forms. Further, bulking of milk from multiple suppliers increases the 
potential level of losses due to spoilage. These losses limit marketing options for 
small and remote dairy producers, raise transport costs, and imply greater loss s 
due to spoilage than for commodities such as grains. Because milk production 
typically is a year-round activity, dairy producers often must be concerned with 
maintaining outlets for their production. 
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The search for stable market outlets by producers is complicated by significant 
seasonal variation in milk production and dairy product consumption (Jaffee, 
1995; Debrah and Anteneh, 1991). In part due to high perishability, but also due 
to natural variation, milk quality is variable. Some of its properties (e.g., bacterial 
counts) are also not easily ascertained. Although not a perfect proxy, we 
conjecture that distance between production and purchasing points is highly 
correlated with quality, which declines rapidly after milking. The lack of easily 
measurable quality standards may also allow agents purchasing raw milk from 
producers to reject milk without just cause when they have contracted to 
purchase more milk than can be profitably sold. 
Differential transactions costs among households stem from asymmetries in 
access to assets, information, services and remunerative markets (Delgado 
forthcoming). Handling these access problems requires institutional innovation. 
First, the asset-deficit problem of resource-poor small-holders is often so great 
that a net transfer (such as a heifer) is necessary to induce entry. Second, 
technical and market information for new commercial items is more likely to be 
useful to individuals with higher levels of schooling, greater work experience, 
better access to management and technical advice, and better knowledge of 
market opportunities. Small-holders may require particular support in information 
and management. Third, access to services is often unequally distributed within 
communities. Poor infrastructure, low population density, and low effective 
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demand make necessary institutions for risk-sharing and economies of scale in 
provision of agricultural services, especially in remoter areas. Fourth, better 
access to remunerative markets for high-value-to weight items is necessary for 
promoting growth of small-holder agriculture.  
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3. COOPERATIVES AS CATALYSTS 
A common form of collective action to address access problems of this type is a 
participatory, farmer-led cooperative that handles input purchasing and 
distribution and output marketing, usually after some form of bulking or 
processing. Farmers gain the benefit of assured supplies of the right inputs at 
the right time, frequently, credit against output deliveries, and an assured market 
for the output at a price that is not always known in advance, but applied equally 
to all farmers in given location and time period. Extension is sometimes part of 
the services provided, typically at higher rates (and quality) than state extension 
services. Cooperatives, by providing bulking and bargaining services, increase 
outlet market access and help farmers avoid the hazards of being encumbered 
with a perishable crop with no rural demand. In short, participatory cooperatives 
are very helpful in overcoming access barriers to assets, information, services, 
indeed, the markets within which small-holders wish to produce high-value items 
(Jaffee and Morton, 1995). 
Like contract farming, producer cooperatives can offer processors/marketers the 
advantage of an assured supply of the commodity at known intervals at a fixed 
price and a controlled quality. They can also provide the option of making 
collateralized loans to farmers. For processors or marketers, such arrangements 
eliminate the principal-agent issues faced by collectives and outgrower schemes 
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in monitoring effort by the individual producer, providing better relations with local 
communities than large-scale farms, avoiding the expense and risk of investing 
in such enterprises, sharing production risk with the farm r, nd helping ensure 
that farmers provide produce of a consistent quality (Grosh, 1994; Delgado, 
forthcoming). 
Producer cooperatives are unlike contract farming schemes, however, with 
respect to negotiations among different partners. If the issue in contract farming 
revolves around the power of farmers to negotiate with processors in producer 
coops, the issue in the coops themselves is the power of members, collectively, 
to hold management accountable. Producer coops in Africa have had a 
generally unhappy history, because of difficulties in holding management 
accountable to the members (i.e., moral hazard), leading to inappropriate 
political activities or financial irregularities in management (de Janvry, Sadoulet, 
and Thorbecke, 1993; Akwabi-Ameyaw 1997), and also due to over-ambitious 
investment in scale and enterprises beyond management’s capability. The 
degree of moral hazard seems to be greater if cooperatives are general in their 
orientations rather than created for specific purposes, such as farmer-run local 
milk marketing coops in Uganda and Kenya (Staal et al., 1997). In Ethiopia, on 
the other, hand, the perception exists (Nicholson, 1997) that there may be 
enormous potential for their role, in concert with production innovations, as 
market precipitators. 
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4. EXPERIENCE IN ETHIOPIA
The traditional system of milk production in Ethiopia, comprising small rural and 
peri-urban farmers, uses local breeds, which produce about 400-680 kg of milk 
per cow per lactation period. More recently, intensive systems as diverse as 
state enterprises and small and large private farms use exotic breeds and their 
crosses, which have the potential to produce 1120-2500 liters per day over a 
279-day lactation (Debrah and Anteneh, 1991).  Fresh milk marketing is 
channeled through both formal and informal outlets, with informal markets 
supplying some 85% of total fresh milk in the Addis Ababa area (Staal, 1995). 
The major formal outlets are dominated by a government enterprise called the 
Dairy Development Enterprise (DDE), which has established numerous collection 
centers that buy milk at a uniform government controlled price that requires no 
minimum delivery. In 1992/93, the DDE supplied 12% of total fresh milk sales in 
Addis Ababa (Staal, 1995). The DDE is concerned primarily with fluid milk 
marketing, although it does make some cheese and yogurt in its Addis Ababa 
processing facilities. 
The informal fresh milk market involves direct delivery of raw milk by producers 
to consumers in the immediate neighborhood and sales to itinerant traders or 
individuals in nearby towns. Milk is transported to towns on foot, by donkey, by 
horse or public transport and frequently commands a higher price than in the 
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originating locale (Debrah and Antenneh, 1991). In Ethiopia, fresh milk sales by 
small-holder farmers are important only when they are close to formal milk 
marketing facilities such as government enterprises or milk groups. Results from 
a sample of farmers in Northern Shewa in 1986 estimated that 96% of the 
marketable milk was sold to the DDE (Debrah and Anteneh, 1991).  Farmers far 
from such formal marketing outlets prefer to produce other dairy products 
instead, such as cooking butter and cottage cheese (table 1). In fact, the vast 
majority of milk produced outside urban centers in Ethiopia is processed into 
products by the farm household, and sold to traders or other households in local 
markets. 
The other principal outlets for milk are ‘milk groups,’ which are milk marketing 
cooperatives recently established by the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture’s 
Small-holder Dairy Development Project (SDDP) with the support of the Finnish 
International Development Association. The milk groups buy milk from both 
members and non-members, process it, and sell the derivative products to 
traders and local consumers. Although the milk groups sometimes sell fluid milk 
products such as sour milk, skim milk, or buttermilk, most of their revenue is 
generated by sales of processed dairy products, butter and cottage cheese 
(Nicholson, 1998).  The groups do not presently represent a significant source of 
fresh milk for either rural or urban markets. 
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Table 1-Household Sales Composition and Distance to Market 
Distance from the DDE Collection Center
0-3 km 3-10 km
Milk sales(liters per 
household per day) 
Butter sales(grams per 
household per day) 
Cheese(grams per 
household per day) 
Total milk equivalent(liters 
per household per day) 
3.2 0.1 
7.0 96.9 
0.0 11.3 
3.2 2.4 
Source: Debrah and Anteneh, 1996.
 (insert table 1 about here). 
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5. BACKGROUND TO THE EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
The SDDP milk groups purchase raw milk from farmers, then use hand-operated 
equipment to process the milk into butter, local cottage-type cheese (ayib), and 
yogurt-like sour milk (ergo).  These dairy products are sold to local households, 
to traders who market them, in turn, to major urban centers, and local 
restauranteurs. Typically, the value added from processing the fluid milk into 
products (less funds retained for maintenance of the groups’ facilities) is returned 
as a semi-annual, lump-sum payment to group members and others who have 
supplied the group during the period since the previous payment. 
At the time of data collection four of these milk groups existed, two in the Shewa 
region north of Addis Ababa and two in the Arsi region near the regional center 
Asela. The activities of these groups are focused exclusively on the processing 
and selling of dairy products. They provide no additional services (i.e., no credit, 
feeds, veterinary services, etc.) to farmers nor to buyers and, therefore, 
represent the simpler end of the continuum of activities that cooperative 
organizations might undertake. 
Although the number of farmers and the amount of milk received at each group 
is not a large proportion of regional totals, the formation of these groups has 
created a new outlet for sales of fluid milk by producers. Prior to the formation of 
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the groups, nearly all locally produced milk was processed into butter and ayib by 
the households. Even now, most milk produced in these areas is marketed as 
home-processed dairy products and sold to traders or other households in local 
markets. Thus, the milk groups can be considered organizational innovations 
that increase the number of marketing options available to small-holder dairy 
farmers and mitigate some of the principal transactions costs that retard entry. 
We now turn to the identification of remaining factors (technology, infrastructure 
and household capital accumulation) that may forestall entry. 
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6. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES
Data were collected from four rural communities called ‘Peasant Associations’ 
(PAs) (which are state-designated partitions of rural districts) near two of the four 
milk groups formed by the SDDP. Preliminary surveys were undertaken in 
December 1996 and January 1997 to ascertain the extent of crossbred cow 
ownership. On the basis of the preliminary surveys, the Mirti and Ashebaka PAs 
in the area of the Lemu Ariya milk group were selected from Arsi region, and the 
Ilu-Kura and Archo PAs were selected near the Edoro milk group in Shewa 
region. One PA in each region was close enough to the milk group that 
cooperative selling occurred; the other was distant enough that sales were 
precluded. None of the households in the Ashebaka and Archo PAs participated 
in the milk groups, whereas a proportion of the households in Mirti and Ilu-Kura 
PAs delivered milk to the groups. 
A census of households in these four PAs was conducted for the purpose of 
developing a sampling frame. Using the census results, a sample of 36 
households was selected in each of the PAs, stratified by whether the household 
owned crossbred cows, participated in the group, and their distance to the group 
or to another local market where dairy products could be sold. During June 
1997, baseline surveys of household characteristics and current cattle 
management practices were administered to 144 households. From June 1997 
to October 1997, data on milk allocation and marketing, significant events 
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occurring in the cattle herd (births, deaths, purchases, sales, illness, etc.), and 
cow feeding practices were collected every two to three weeks. 
From the survey, we focus on the 68 households in the Mirti and Ilu-Kura PAs for 
which samples were observed on milk sales in the seven days prior to three 
respective visits, yielding a total of 1428 = 68 ´ 7 ´ 3 observations. Table 2 
summarizes the data by market participation status 
Table 2-Selected characteristics of survey households, by market participation 
status 
Sample Means (standard errors)
Sold to the milk group Did not sell to the milk group
Number of crossbred cows 0.68 0.59 
(0.82) (0.78) 
1.35 1.41Number of local cows 
(1.04) (1.12) 
Time to the milk group, 
43.27 44.45minutes 
(28.36) (29.13) 
Farm experience of 
25.36 24.50household head, years 
(15.40) (15.89) 
Formal schooling of 
1.83 1.92household head, years 
(3.25) (3.35) 
Visits by an extension 
1.03 1.07agent during past year 
(1.92) (2.16) 
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7. ESTIMATION
A Tobit specification using a Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to 
derive estimates of the quantities of interest is applied. It is motivated in three 
steps. First, household maximization is formalized. Second, relaxing the non-
negativity restriction on marketable surplus, a set of latent values are implied for 
the nonparticipating households. Third, because we observe the value zero for 
these households rather than the latent quantities, the data are censored and 
Tobit estimation is relevant. 
Although relatively new, MCMC methods are now widely used in Bayesian 
inference. However, applications in development economics have thus far been 
few. Details of the procedure are presented in Chib (1992). His approach 
combines Gibbs sampling with data augmentation. Seminal contributions in 
these two areas are Gelfand and Smith and Tanner and Wong, but very 
readable introductions are Casella and George, Chib and Greenberg, and 
Tanner. 
Let Fi( ·  ) denote the level of a maximand of interest in household “i” (say, the 
level of expected utility); let Fi( · ) denote its first-order partial derivative with 
respect to variable, vi (the level of marketable surplus from the household); and 
let xi ” (x1i, x2i .. xmi) denote a vector of factors affecting the choice of vi (the 
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composition of the physical capital in the household, the physical distance that it 
resides from the market, and the stocks of intellectual capital that the household 
has accumulated). Then, across each of the households i = 1, 2 .. N, we are 
concerned with the problem: 
(1) max Fi( vi , xi ) subject to vi ‡  0 ;vi 
the derivative condition on the objective function, 
(2) ji( vi , xi ) £ 0;
 
the non-negativity restriction on marketable surplus,
 
(3) vi ‡ 0; 
and the complementary-slackness condition, 
(4) ji( vi , xi ) vi  = 0. 
Ignoring the restriction in (3) for the moment and assuming strict equality in (2), a 
first-order MacLaurin-series expansion in the left-hand side yields 
m 
(5) ji + jvi vi + � jxki xki = 0, 
k =1 
where the function ji and the partial derivatives jvi and jxki, k = 1, 2 .. m, are 
evaluated at the point vi = 0, xi = 0. Accordingly, we have a (locally) valid 
expression relating the household’s choice of vi t  the levels of the covariates, 
xki, k = 1, 2 .. m, in the linear equation 
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m 
(6)	 vi  = b0 + � bkx ki , i = 1, 2 .. N; 
k =1 
b0 ”-ji jvi
-1 and bk ”-jxki jvi
-1, k = 1, 2 .. m. But, when vi is negative we actually 
observe zero and, therefore, the relevant statistical framework is the censored 
regression model 
m 
(7)	 zi  = b0 + � bkx ki + ei , i = 1, 2 .. N; 
k =1 
ei ~ N( 0 , s2 ) and we observe yi = max{ zi , 0 }. 
Although some interest resides with the parameters in (7), our fundamental 
concern lies with the levels of the covariates that are required for participation in 
the market, that is, the measures beyond which positive marketable surplus is 
implied for the non-participants in the (censor) set c”{ i : zi £0 }. The values of 
interest follow naturally from setting marketable surplus to zero in (7); solving for 
each of the covariates, 
m 
b0 + �b jx ji + e i 
j„k(8)	 xˆki = , k = 1, 2 .. m, i ˛ c; -bk 
and computing means across the set of non-participating households, say n in 
total, 
(9)	 x ki  = 
1 
� xˆ ki , k = 1, 2 .. m. 
n i˛c 
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8. RESULTS 
Table 3 reports results of the estimation. All but one of the covariates 
(experience) is significant at the 5% level. Thus, each of the other covariates has 
a significant impact on marketable surplus and, therefore, entry into the milk 
market. Focusing on the parameter estimates themselves, the addition of one 
cross-bred cow raises surplus by about 4.4 liters of milk per day and the addition 
of one local cow increases surplus by about 1.8 liters—a clear and obvious 
difference between the modern and the traditional production techniques. 
Distance-to market on the other hand causes surplus to decline, and we 
estimate that for each one-hour reduction in return time to walk to the milk-group, 
marketable surplus increases by about 3.5 liters.  Of the capital-forming 
variables, (experience, education, and extension) education and visits by an 
extension agent are significant, but surplus is unresponsive to farm experience. 
The estimates of the responses to education and extension are, perhaps, more 
important for our study because these variables are potentially more likely to be 
directly affected by policy. For each additional year of formal schooling of the 
farm decision-maker, daily marketable surplus increases by about 0.30 liters 
and, for each additional visit by an extension agent, increases by almost 1.0 
liters. The summary statistics suggest a reasonable amount of fit given the high 
proportion of censoring in the sample—approximately 85% are nonparticipants. 
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Table 3-Marketable-surplus Tobit-equation estimates 
Estimate
Regressor (standard error)
Number of crossbred cows 4.43 
(0.38) 
Number of local cows 1.81 
(0.26) 
Time to the milk group, minutes -0.06 
(0.01) 
Farm experience of household head, 0.0027 
years 
(0.0233) 
Formal schooling of household head, 0.28 
years 
(0.10) 
Extension agent visits during the past 0.94 
year 
(0.11) 
Constant -12.40 
(1.39) 
Square Root of the Variance 27.47 
(3.98) 
Summary Statistics 
Uncensored observations
R2 0.35 
Positive predicted values 63 
Negative predicted values 105 
Censored observations
R2 0.98 
Positive predicted values 21 
Negative predicted values 1239 
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Turning to the distance measures, table 4 reports point estimates of the 
‘distance’ statistics (equation (9)). They are revealing. In order to effect entry, 
the representative non-participant must increase surplus by 9.8 liters per day. 
Such an increase, it appears, could be effected by a variety of techniques, 
including additions to the milking herd of 2.2 crossbred animals or, instead, by 
6.4 local cows, a feasible but nonetheless substantial increase in productive 
assets. Of the remaining covariates for which the distance estimates are 
significant, entry could also be effected by reducing transport time by almost two 
hours or by increasing the frequency of extension visits to around 10 per 
household per year. 
Table 4-Distance estimates 
Estimate (standard error)
Marketable Surplus -9.81 
(5.63) 
Number of crossbred cows 2.52 
(0.13) 
Number of indigenous cows 6.45 
(0.67) 
Time to the milk group, minutes -114.26 
(33.50) 
Farm experience of household head, years -757.12 
(58289.48) 
Formal schooling of household head, years 45.26 
(444.96) 
Extension agent visits during the past year 10.43 
(0.91) 
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9. DISCUSSION
The policy-relevant variables having the greatest impact on participation in fluid 
milk markets are cow numbers, time to the milk group, and visits by an extension 
agent. The number of cows kept affects marketable surplus through both total 
production and the marginal costs of production. An increase in total milk 
production by the household decreases the marginal utility of milk consumption 
and, thus, should increase marketable surplus.  In the case where additional 
cows lower marginal costs of production, this also increases marketable surplus 
because the household is assumed to equate marginal costs of production and 
milk price net of transactions costs. Finally, a higher marketable surplus per 
farm potentially reduces that farm’s average costs of milk transfer to the group, 
as well as lowering average production costs on the farm. Thus, pooling 
activities, especially milk collection and transport activities, has potential to 
mitigate costs.  However, problems of coordinating and monitoring agreements 
between participants and the costs engendered by such ventures is likely to 
dissipate any potential gains from exploiting scale economies. 
Our empirical analysis does not distinguish among possible scale effects, but this 
does not appear to be crucial for policy purposes given the net, positive impacts 
of cow numbers (of both breeds) on marketable surplus. The difference between 
the impacts of local and crossbred cows on marketable surplus and fluid milk 
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market participation has more relevance for policy. In theory, the marginal costs 
of milk production are equated for crossbred and local cows if the household 
owns both types. However, not all households own both types of cows, and 
other market imperfections (e.g., feed and services availability) may imply higher 
marginal costs for crossbred animals. Higher marginal costs for crossbred cows 
imply a negative gross effect (despite the positive net impact of crossbreds) on 
marketable surplus compared to local cows.  The magnitude of this effect can be 
approximated using annualized milk yield per day for crossbreds and local cows 
and multiplying these by the ‘distance’ estimates from table 5. 
Annualized milk yields per day from a farm survey in the peri-urban area of Addis 
Ababa are 3.9 liters for crossbred cows and 1.2 liters for local cows. Multiplying 
these milk yields by the Tobit distance estimates of daily milk production implied 
for market entry are 9.8 liters for crossbred cows and 7.7 liters for local cows.  If 
the estimates reflected only the transactions costs related to the level of 
marketable surplus, we would expect these figures to be equal. Further, since 
milk prices paid to farmers in this sample do not distinguish between milk from 
local and crossbred cows, milk quality can be safely assumed not to contribute to 
this difference. The difference can thus be presumed to relate to differences in 
technology (including scale effects). Thus the higher milk level needed from 
crossbred cows suggests that some 27% more ‘milk production potential’ 
(capacity) is needed in the form of crossbred cows compared to local cows in 
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order to effect entry. Whether this is related to downside risk of disease, 
different feed requirements, or differential scale effects on unit production and 
transfer costs, is uncertain. However, the relatively small difference suggests 
that although transactions costs related to technological obstacles are evident, 
they are not insurmountable. Further, to the extent that policy and other 
interventions can reduce this difference in marginal costs, crossbred cows will 
have a larger impact on marketable surplus of fluid milk. 
The Tobit estimate of time to milk group shows that sales to the milk group could 
be effected by reducing the milk delivery time from farm to collection point by an 
average of 114 minutes. This is clearly related to the transactions costs of 
reallocating family labor to milk delivery. Given the current limited number of 
milk groups in Ethiopia, and the very large number of rural households with 
cattle, this result suggests a potentially simple policy intervention. Currently, 
many potential fluid milk-marketing households are hours distant from any milk 
group. Setting up new groups would clearly reduce the time to group for a 
number of households close to the group. Of course, the actual number of 
households that would benefit depends on local population densities. 
Any policy support to raise small-holder participation in milk marketing based on 
our analysis of factors influencing fluid milk sales would necessarily have to 
weigh public costs against the expected gains by small-holder households. The 
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existing milk groups were established by a development project at an estimated 
cost of EB 44,350 each, or about $US 5,350;  Given prices at the time of group 
formation, the cost of a milk group is roughly equivalent in market value to some 
10 crossbred cows. Given the density of households in many parts of rural 
Ethiopia, one such investment is likely to bring about market entry of more than 4 
households, the number implied by the yield of 10 cows. Further, the availability 
of crossbred cows for purchase by small-holders is limited.  Policies to promote 
expansion of crossbred numbers—currently less than 100,000 in Ethiopia—rely 
on expansion of the domestic herd, largely at government-owned facilities. 
Imports of crossbred cattle are severely restricted (particularly from Kenya) due 
to fears of disease risk. The resulting slow growth of the domestic herd of 
crossbred animals also provides support for the formation of cooperatives, with 
or without the provision of additional crossbred animals. 
The ultimate benefits of participation in fluid milk sales—and the survival of the 
milk groups themselves—will depend on their continued ability to capture value-
added in dairy processing and return that value-added to their members.  This, in 
turn, relies on the groups’ abilities to offer producers a higher return net of 
transactions cost than alternative market outlets.  Whether they will continue to 
do so remains to be seen, but first impressions from our two sample sites are 
positive. 
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10. CONCLUSIONS
The ideas developed here are simple and so is the message we are motivating: 
Institutional innovations by themselves are insufficient to catalyze entry; they 
must be accompanied by a mix of other inputs including infrastructure, 
knowledge and asset accumulation in the household. Although it is not 
surprising that milk groups increase the participation of small-holders in fluid milk 
markets in Ethiopia’s highlands, our empirical results provide insights about how 
to promote further market participation by small-holder producers.  Locating 
groups so as to minimize the time required to market milk increases the number 
of participating producers and the level of marketable surplus. Given the 
difficulty and cost of providing crossbred animals (as experienced by such heifer-
loan schemes as Heifer Project International in other parts of Africa), investment 
in infrastructure such as the milk groups provides a low cost mechanism for 
increasing small-holder participation and furthering the integration of traditional 
producers into agro-industrial systems.  These results are likely to hold relevance 
for other perishable and time-constrained agricultural products, such as winter 
vegetables, cut flowers, and the like and, perhaps, a wide and broader set of 
circumstances. 
Milk groups are a simple example of an agroindustrialization innovation, but they 
appear to be a necessary first step in the process of developing more 
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sophisticated cooperative organizations. Costs of milk production in Ethiopia are 
low compared to world prices (Staal, 1995) but high transactions costs for 
households and processors alike prevent dairy exports.  Thus, derivative impacts 
of the innovation in effecting globalization are precluded at present. Time will tell 
whether the experience obtained from the milk groups may serve as a basis for 
development of producer-oriented processing that better integrates small-holder 
producers with global agro-industry. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
REFERENCES 
Akwabi-Ameyaw, K, 1997.  producer cooperative resettlement projects in 
Zimbabwe: Lessons from a failed agricultural development strategy. World 
Development 25, 437-456. 
Casella, G., George, E.  Explaining the Gibbs sampler. American Statistician 
46, 167-74. 
Chib, S, 1992. Bayes inference in the Tobit censored regression model. Journal 
of Econometrics 52, 79-99. 
, Greenberg, E. Understanding the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.  American 
Statistician 49, 327-335. 
Debrah, S., Anteneh, B., 1991. Dairy marketing in Ethiopia: markets of first sale 
and producer's marketing patterns. ILCA Research Report, No.19. 
International Livestock Center for Africa. 
de Janvry, A., Sadoulet, E., Thorbecke, E., 1993. Introduction to a special 
section, state, market, and civil organizations: New theories, new practices, 
and their implications for rural development. World Development 21, 565­
575. 
Delgado, C., forthcoming. Sources of growth in small-holder agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa: The role of vertical integration with processors of high-value 
items. Agrarekon (Journal of the South African Agricultural Economics 
Association). Special issue, Proceedings of the International Association of 
Agricultural Economists, Badplaas, South Africa, August 10-16, 1998. 
  
  
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32
 
, 1995. Agricultural diversification and export promotion in sub-
Saharan Africa. Food Policy 20, 225-43. 
, 1996. Marketing, institutional and infrastructural policies for 
agricultural diversification and export promotion (MP-7): Conceptual and 
methodological issues. Mimeo, International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington D.C. 
Gelfand, A., Smith, A., 1990. Sampling-based approaches to calculating 
marginal densities.  Journal of the American Statistical Association 85, 972­
985. 
Grosh, B., 1994. Contract farming in Africa: An application of the new 
institutional economics. Journal of African Economies 3, 231-261. 
Jaffee, S., 1994. Perishable profits: Private sector dairy processing and 
marketing in Kenya, in Jaffee, S. and J. Morton (eds.) Marketing Africa's 
High-Valued Foods: Comparative Experiences of an Emergent Private 
Sector, Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall-Hunt, pp. 199-253. 
Morton, J., Coulter, J., Miheso, V., Staal, S. J., Kenyanjui, M., Tallontire, A., 
1999. Provision of agricultural services through cooperatives and self-help 
groups in the dairy sector of Kenya. Research Report OVI 3.1, Natural 
Resources Institute, UK. 
Nicholson, C. F., 1997. The impact of milk groups in the Shewa and Arsi regions 
of Ethiopia: Project description, survey methodology, and collection 
procedures. Mimeograph, Livestock Policy Analysis Project, International 
Livestock Research Institute, Addis Ababa. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33
 
Nicholson, C. F., Gebru, G., Ehui, S. K., Shapiro, B., I., Delgado, C., 1998. 
Producer milk groups in Ethiopia’s highlands: A framework for assessing 
impacts and a review of group performance. Paper presented at a workshop 
on The Role of Village Cooperatives in Dairy Development: Prospects for 
Improving Dairy in Ethiopia. International Livestock Research Institute, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, April 22-24. 
Owango, M., Staal, S. J., Kenyanjui, M, Lukuyu, B., Njubi, D., Thorpe, W., 1998.  
Dairy co-operatives and policy reform in Kenya: Effects of livestock service 
and milk market liberalization. Food Policy, 23, 173-185. 
Small-holder Dairy Project (SDP), 1988a.  Assessment of informal milk market 
performance and associated public health risks in Kenya: A rapid appraisal. 
Nairobi: Small-holder Dairy Project, Government of Kenya, Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
Small-holder Dairy Project (SDP), 1988b.  Description. International Livestock 
Research Institute, Ministry of Agriculture and Kenya Agricultural Research 
Institute, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Staal, S. J., 1995. Peri-urban dairying and public policy in Ethiopia and Kenya: A 
comparative institutional and economic analysis. Gainesville: University of 
Florida Ph.D. Dissertation. 
Staal, S. J., Delgado, C., Nicholson, C., 1997. Small-holder dairying under 
transactions costs in East Africa. World Development 25, 779-794. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
34
 
Staal, S. J., Shapiro, B. The effects of price decontrol on Kenyan peri-urban 
dairying: A case study using the policy analysis matrix approach. Food Policy 
19, 533-549. 
Tanner, M. H., 1993. Tools for statistical inference: methods for the exploration 
of posterior distributions and likelihood functions. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
, Wong, W. H., 1987. The calculation of posterior distributions by 
data augmentation. Journal of the American Statistical Association 82, 528­
50. 
